The religious, or confessional, history of the modern Europe, split by the Reformation, is, for one thing, a history of religious disputes and the related political confl icts, but it extends in parallel to attempts at regaining the lost unity -and also, to the absorbing history of elaboration of methods of peaceful arrangement of relationships between communities and states that had grown irreversibly diversifi ed in terms of religion.
to be analysed against the background of a whole series of decrees and agreements, which was concluded by the best-known specimen -the Edict of Nantes, 1598. 2 Discussion was another method that proved popular especially among the humanists and was meant to eliminate the confessional splits; the best known Catholic-Lutheran colloquies took place in Hagenau, Worms, and Regensburg in 1540-1. 3 A shared characteristics of the numerous meetings of this type was their ineffi ciency, or perhaps, a peculiar counter-effi ciency. Instead of clarifying the disagreements and render the confl icting positions close to one another, the public discussions among theologians turned into a forum of propagating their own views, without paying attention to the interlocutors' arguments. Interestingly enough, no great importance was attached in the sixteenth-century Polish-Lithuanian state to such disputes. It was only in the following century that the organisers of the Colloquium charitativum, held in Toruń in 1645 on the wave of irenicism, endeavoured to give the meeting an international dimension.
As the edicts issued by the authorities and scholars' discussions turned out not quite effi cient, a forceful solution was subsequently sought for, with miserable political and deplorable social effects. It should suffi ce to compare William Monter's fi ndings on the number of victims of confessional trials in the sixteenth century, assessed by this author as 5,000 maximum, against the number of victims of religious wars in France, as established by James Wood, with some 270 out of 100,000 inhabitants getting killed each year between 1560 and 1580. 4 The intensifi ed religious oppression in the sixteenth century brought about unexpected effects in that political theologians of the Protestant and, thereafter, Catholic camp developed the theory of the right to resist, which later became an important element in the evolution of modern-era communities of subjects into modern societies of citizens.
The idea whereby preservation of peace in the state is valued higher than the striving for the unattainable confessional unity -a concept present since long ago in the Polish political culture -began being accepted with increasing frequency in the Western Europe toward the late sixteenth century. Justus Lipsius, the great authority of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, claimed that, given the insurmountable confessional differentiation, the consent for functioning of heterodox communities, if regulated and controlled, is not necessary dangerous for the state. The political interest of a state that had been reinforced resulting from the Reformation transformations began dominating over the religious interest of the Churches, debilitated by the rivalry.
There was a practically functioning broad spectrum of forms of coexistence with the heterodoxies. The worst situation, from today's standpoint, was the case in the extensive peripheral areas where unorthodox views were punished (the Pyrenean and Apennine Peninsulas, Russia). In the conventional 'intolerance scale', next to them are usually placed certain Evangelical territories, e.g. Geneva, which still is considered a theocratic, i.e. clergy-governed, state. level was characterised by a strict rationing of the dissenters' rights, as was the case with the Lutheran Scandinavia or in the British Isles with regard to the Catholics. At last, the German Reich adopted the rule of territorialisation, which implied the practice of cuius regio eius religio and a whole array of a variety of local solutions. After 1598, France applied a system: combining territorialisation with the statesupervised rationing and regulation. Moreover, the Commonwealth, Transylvania, and Northern Netherlands and, periodically, Bohemia, Moravia and Hungary had internal relationships close to equal rights of the confessions. In practice, the most common standard of the confessional state's attitude towards the dissenters was, however, the ban on public cult as coupled with toleration towards them, or even with ensuring them the right to private cult.
The peaceful relationships occurring in the Polish-Lithuanian state between the various factions of Christianity, tolerance for nonChristians -Jews and Muslims, in the fi rst place -have been of interest not only to historians: it was already in the sixteenth and seventeenth century that they drew attention of the supporters of equal religious rights, which mostly meant theoreticians: thinkers and writers.
6 This is particularly true for late-Renaissance humanists -those who formulated the postulates for solving the problems of coexistence of the dissidentes in religione in line with the evangelistic love ideals advocated by Erasmus of Rotterdam. After all, the latter once wrote to Archbishop William Warham in as early as 1524, not without rhetorical exaggeration: "Polonia mea est."
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The range of humanism's infl uence in the sixteenth-century Poland can be assessed in different ways. 8 We often tend to forget, however, that Erasmus's views were opposed by many, at the various sides 6 of confessional barricades which were fervently erected by the followers of Rome and Wittenberg, later also of Geneva. Thus, the religious relations in Poland in the sixteenth century were perceived negatively by some political theorists who adopted the apparently obvious assumption that a state must be confessional; no other model was conceivable to them, as Antoni Mączak points out. 9 There was a commonplace conviction that wherever the authorities, along with those professing the ruling religions (which usually meant the ruler's religion), are tolerant toward the adherents of other confessions, there is an incessant jeopardy of confl ict and, therefore, a constant threat to the state owing to disloyalty of the dissenter subjects.
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It is worth noting, by the way, that the doctrine rendering the state's strength dependent on the level of confessional homogenisation of its population is reminiscent of the views of our contemporary theoreticians who associate the safety of a state with its ethnic homogeneity with the national awareness of its inhabitants. 11 In the sixteenth and seventeenth century, however, it was the ethnic mosaic of the Polish-Lithuanian state that made some political authors disturbed. Of an issue to them was, instead, the religious and confessional multifariousness and, in the fi rst place, the impotence of the Commonwealth authorities, incomprehensible for many, in that they were long refraining from imposition of the confessional coercion -the option seemingly so benefi cial to the state -even where the legal and political realities so allowed. According to this theory, the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which from 1569 onwards made up the Commonwealth of the Two Nations -a multi-denominational state, without a strong executive power or effi cient administration -must have been politically weak, doomed to internal confl icts, external interventions, and, fi nally, roll down into the abyss of religious wars, and eventually collapse. But was it the faith-related freedoms as reinforced in 1573 by the Warsaw Confederation that formed the background of the Polish-Lithuanian state's crisis occurring since the middle of the seventeenth century?
At the end of the sixteenth century, the belief that a fall of the Commonwealth was forthcoming was advocated, among others, by an author using the penname of Gulielmus Rossaeus, who was associated with the French Catholic League.
12 On the margin of one of his works whose main argument was Henry of Navarre's illegitimate claims to the throne of France, he dealt with the confessional relations in the Commonwealth. The fact that the tradition of denominational and religious diversity had been older in Poland than the Reformation was unknown to Rossaeus, and he focused on discussing the effects of the actions of Evangelicals, particularly Calvinists -the central target of his attacks -which apparently were menacing to the state. 13 In Rossaeus's view, it was them to have brought about the equal rights for non-Catholics in the Commonwealth; he was particularly resentful of the toleration for the Anti-Trinitarians, whom he considered, along with Calvinists, to be willing to cooperate with Islam. This interesting interpretation of the Commonwealth's history, albeit not having much in common with the reality, reminds one also of how the confessional situation of the appraiser determined his view and opinions -a dependence so characteristic to the tolerance discourse. Suffi ce it to compare the argument of the above-quoted Catholic author against the views of Andrzej Lubieniecki (d. 1623), to clearly see that both made use of a similar, though completely reversed, perspective. For Rossaeus, as a member of the Catholic Church, considering itself to be the reigning entity -similarly as to Piotr Skarga, somewhat later -equality of rights for the heterodoxies led to 15 a collapse of the state; for Lubieniecki, member of the Polish Brethren, it was the source of the state's strength. Rossaeus's stance was that it was only the infl uence of the Counter-Reformation that could save the Commonwealth from a decline, whereas Lubieniecki saw it as the greatest threat to the Polish-Lithuanian state. 17 This contradiction is striking but comprehensible, as both authors rendered their historiosophical evaluations subject to their denominational perspective.
As we know today, the Polish-Lithuanian state never became plunged in religious confl icts, contrary to what the author of De iusta Reipublicae christianae … (1592) forecast (and unlike France in sixteenth century, or Germany in sixteenth and seventeenth centuries). On the contrary: during the reign of King Sigismund II Augustus, Stephen Bathory, and then on, Sigismund III Vasa, the multi-denominational Commonwealth confi rmed its position as a regional power in the Eastern Europe, which undermined the relevance of the theory that defi ned a state's strength in inverse proportion to the level of its denominational diversity, and was refl ected in Polish utterances on this subject-matter.
In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, the gravity centre in the argumentation employed in the discussions on confessional policies began moving from the theological into political sphere. 18 The doctrine of confessional state, in association with the idea of raison d'état, fi nally brought about a positive outcome to the State-Church relationships and to the situation of the dissenters in the seventeenth century. In the states which entered at that time the path of absolutistic modernisation, this approach stabilised their situation -true, often at a low level of powers granted, but this still marked a clear progress, compared to the religious wars period. Regardless of the differences in the views of confessionalisation and its relations with modernisation, it may be accepted that the standardisation of confessional relations in the spirit of a political neo-stoicism generally led to their stabilisation in the Western Europe. In Northern Netherlands and in England, the areas where the 17 Calvinist political doctrines exerted their strongest impact, concepts even occurred whereby the state's control over the Church would turn into a separation of the two institutions.
As for the Commonwealth, where the raison-d'état ideas as defi ned by Catholic neo-stoics arrived at an early stage, an attempt at their practical application by reinstating a confessional (i.e. Catholic) character to the state, in the early years of the seventeenth century, proved abortive. Relying on the account of Thomas Roe, English diplomat and keen observer of the Eastern-European developments, what Sigismund III was after was, at the utmost, a soft religious unifi cation of the society (let us highlight the soft aspect) and, in the longer run, probably its Catholic confessionalisation. 19 Before then, in the sixteenth century, the Polish and Lithuanian political elites abode by the raison-d'état rules avant la lettre, in the Commonwealth's multidenominational and multi-religious society, whereas the European coercion-based pattern of confessional policy seemed deterring to them. When the country's Catholic-dominated elites made an attempt, in the following century, to resume the confessional state model, as prevalent in Europe at the time, it proved to be a diffi cult exercise, and resulting from the efforts benefi tting the Catholic confessionalisation, the position of the Catholic Church, rather than Commonwealth, grew reinforced. It fell to the Commonwealth's lot, however, to pay at a later date for the confl ict with the dissenters, which -taken advantage of by the country's expansive neighbours -occurred in the following century to be an instrument of its dismantling.
The seventeenth century was a period of wars the Commonwealth waged against its non-Catholic neighbours: the Orthodox Russia, Lutheran Sweden, and Evangelical Brandenburg/Prussia. Then, a war against the Muslim Ottoman Empire began, and would not end till the late seventeenth century; these confl icts clearly reinforced the Catholic infl uences. The Catholic Church successfully referred not only to political reasons, to the 'bulwark of Christianity' idea, but also, or perhaps primarily, to the social emotions and strengthening xenophobia. 20 ranked amongst the most tolerant European countries, it lost this position in the century's second half. 21 It probably was then that the syndrome described as 'a Pole equals a Catholic' was begotten, with the result that dissenters were excluded from the community of the Commonwealth's citizens.
The apt opinion has solidifi ed whereby the Catholic Church in the Commonwealth, in its rivalry for the rule of people's hearts and minds, made use, primarily, of the Society of Jesus' educational system. It is worth bearing in mind, though, how important was the role the judicature -especially, the tribunals -played in this matter. It was already by means of the regulations of the Crown Tribunal, issued under the reign of Stephen Bathory (1578), that the Catholic clergy gained a strong position in this body, and consequently, in the later years, they strove for the tribunals to consider not only ecclesial income cases and to extend their competencies to trials for heresy, apostasy, blasphemy (as a broad concept), 22 and the cases tried after 1658 ex regestro arianismi. 23 Having at its disposal the school system and the infl uences in the judiciary, and subsequently making use of the advantageous political conditions, the Catholic Church aimed at breaking the equal denominational rights determined in 1573, and afterwards, at restricting the scope of tolerance for the dissenters. Attempts were also made at confessionalising the Commonwealth's society, an increasingly clearly belated project. King John II Casimir's Lvov Oath of 1656 and the expulsion of the Polish Brethren, adopted by the diet in 1658, signifi ed the fi nal breakage of the bonds with those political thought currents that soon after bore fruit in the works of Baruch Spinoza and John Locke. At the same time, the conviction was getting shape in the Western Europe whereby it was the rationing of religious life and limitation of the dissenters' rights that was the embers of confl icts weakening the state. The complex determinants of the State-Church(es) relations and their political consequences were only apparent, in the seventeenth century, to the most eminent theoreticians -particularly those who combined such afterthought with the experience of living in a society deeply diversifi ed confession-wise; in Western Europe, primarily the English and the Dutch formed such societies. It was in England that the political writers of the Revolution and Restoration period strenuously worked on a theory of the state's sovereign power and the issue of stable relations between the state and Churches of different denominations. 25 By way of example, let us just recall the two thinkers who assumed differing positions and therefore formulating dissimilar conclusions: Thomas Hobbes, advocate of state's control over the religious life, 26 and Roger Williams, protagonist of faith freedoms. 27 Characteristically enough, the projects of a radical solution of quitting the traditional association of secular power and sacred authority -thus, inclining towards a separation of the Church and the State, with a resultant secularisation of the latter -were formulated by adherents of so-called civic religion, whose milieus were permeated with the republican ideas of opposition against a strong central authority. 28 Enough to remind that it was in the Northern Netherlands of the 'genuine freedom' period, under the rule of Johan de Witt, an opponent of the 'Orange dynasty', that republican government concepts were developed by the De la Court brothers who, among other things, demanded that the Reformed clergy, quite 'Orange house-inclined' as they were, be removed from political affairs, so that full religious and intellectual freedom could be preserved. 29 Similar, unambiguously anticlerical, views are found in the ideology of the English republicanism, which is not to say that those ideas were antireligious. The continuers of James Harrington's concepts in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century not so much fought Anglicanism as strove for transforming it into a kind of civic cult. 30 Somewhat earlier on, in Holland, Baruch Spinoza worked on his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus which demanded a libertas philosophandi -a broad concept including freedom of thought and utterance. 31 As Leszek Kołakowski reminds, the treatise also postulated the rule of enlightened elite proving able to preserve the climate of political freedom in the interest of permanence of authority and exercising their rule in line with the interest of the people, rather than according to the people's momentary opinion … acting in a way so as to arouse among the masses the conviction that it is them who make the decisions of relevance to the state … 32 Yet, it is clear that the said elites are the secular authorities of Holland in the de Witt period, whilst the Tractatus was correctly interpreted as a design to neutralise the Reformed clergy's infl uence on the public affairs. 33 Spinoza rejected even the views of those advocating the equivalence of secular and clerical authorities (in Chapter XIX):
Sed eos hac ratione imperium dividere, imo viam ad imperium affectare, infra in hoc ipso capite videbimus; nam prius ostendere volo religionem vim juris accipere ex solo eorum decreto, qui jus imperandi habent; et Deum nullum singulare regnum in homines habere nisi per eos, qui imperium tenent, et praeterea quod religionis cultus et pietatis exercitium reipublicae paci et utilitati accommodari, et consequenter a solis summis potestatibus determinari debet, quaeque adeo ejus etiam interpretes debent esse. 34 There is no coincidence, then, that it was on his emigration to Holland that John Locke, the other pillar of the early Enlightenment era, who soon before then had joined the Whigs' conspiracies against the Catholic ruler James II, laid, in his Epistola de tolerantia (1689), the foundations for the doctrine of separation of the Church and the State -possibly infl uenced by the Socinian concepts, 35 but certainly making use of the ideas of the Dutch Staatsgezinden, i.e. adherents of supremacy of secular over sacred authority. Locke's concept deemed the Church of England to be a voluntary association independent upon the state authorities, this being the grounds for the guarantees of tolerance. 36 Regardless of certain differences between Spinoza and Locke in the depiction of the issue, and of the political limitations of the latter's concept -as remarked by Jan de Tex and more recently reminded by Jonathan I. Israel 37 -the aforementioned two memorable treatises, claiming the freedom of thought and utterance and postulating separation of Church and State, laid the foundations for development of the Protestant Enlightenment.
In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, the Whig-ruled England saw deliberations on the State-Church relations conducted in the republican and deist milieus, but even there Locke's views were initially not accepted. 39 John Toland was of opinion that existence of a State religion was a natural thing, and the cult ought to be controlled by the authorities, albeit he hoped that establishing Anglicanism as the ruling denomination should warrant tolerance to the other confessions, deemed private -tolerance being "a truly Protestant principle". 40 Toland referred to the views of James Harrington who also maintained that the State ought to have its offi cial cult. 41 Almost in parallel, however, Matthew Tindal demanded freedom of the press and respect for freedom of thought, in reference to Locke's views, 42 whilst Toland reported to his compatriots on Spinoza's ideas. 43 The origins and the emergence of the main currents of the early Enlightenment are not completely clear yet; in the specifi c sphere of religious relations, Spinoza's and Locke's concepts need being approached separately, with the third great 'tolerantionist' (which he certainly was), Pierre Bayle, being borne in mind. 44 This applies also to the political views of the fi rst generations of enlightened republicans, where the earlier version of classical republicanism, referring to the Roman tradition, needs being meticulously discerned from democratic republicanism which was then in its statu nascendi. 45 Regardless of the doubts and differences appearing between the enlightened 'founding fathers', there was no discord among them (as confi rmed by Immanuel Kant, who wrote his works in the late-Enlightenment period 46 ) about the postulated supremacy of politics (the State) over religion (the Church), no confessional coercion being acceptable. In France, it was even considered, in the 1770s, whether to remove from the royal oath the obligation to fi ght 'the heretics', but the phrase was eventually retained out of respect for the tradition. 47 Regardless of the doubts about the genetic relations between the Reformation in general and Calvinism in particular, on the one hand, and the Enlightenment-era modernisation of the European societies, 48 on the other, there is no doubt that the idea of cutting the Gordian knot by secularising the confessional state bearing the dilemma of parallel existence of multiple religions within it was conceived in the latter half of the seventeenth century in Holland and England, the 'free' -which meant, distant from absolutism -Protestant countries. In that very time, however, as the West of Europe witnessed the emergence of the concepts -so dear to Polish elites of the 'nobility's democracy' period -combining reluctance toward a strong executive monarchal authority with postulates of religious freedom as well as liberty of thought and utterance, the religious and State-Church relations in the Commonwealth proved already much different from the equality of denominations which a hundred years earlier aroused admiration among some and condemnation among the others.
The Catholic confessionalisation policy applied to the Polish-Lithuanian state in the late sixteenth century, intensifi ed in second half of seventeenth century -and very belated, be it in relation to the Habsburg domains bordering on Poland, 49 plus relatively not-quite-effi cient, for political-systemic reasons -had its far-reaching consequences. The confessionalisation action reached its climax in the former half of the eighteenth century -the time the non-Catholic nobility had their political rights initially limited and subsequently abolished, at the diets held in 1717 and 1733-5, 50 whereas the Lutheran authorities of Gdańsk (Danzig), Elbląg (Elbing) and Toruń (Thorn) were intimidated and humiliated on the occasion of the so-called Toruń affair of 1724. 51 However, one of the major consequences of the strivings for reconstruction of the early-modern confessional state model, which was becoming history in the west of Europe, turned out to be the facilitation in the eighteenth century of a political, initially mostly propagandist, use of the religious confl ict by the expansionist neighbour states. 52 When in the early 1770s the Orthodox Russia and Evangelical Prussia embarked on the fi rst partition of the Commonwealth under the pretext of acting in defence of the rights of non-Catholic religious communities, 53 the enlightened European elites voiced no signifi cant protest:
54 their care about the Protestants oppressed in Catholic countries was tactical, and, with only sparse exceptions, they did not understand the specifi c Polish problems, nor were even willing to. 55 Given this standpoint, the statement may seem true whereby the sixteenth-century critics of the Commonwealth's religious relations were all-in-all right: the confl ict about which attempts had been made to render it religious indeed contributed to the collapse of the PolishLithuanian nobility's state. The question about the sequence of the causes and effects still remains valid, though. This question extends to identifying the factors that, in the sphere of religious relations, had a stronger bearing on the debilitation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: equality in rights to the Christian denominations in the sixteenth century; quitting this policy in favour of tolerance, permanently limited afterwards, for non-Catholics in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century; or, the making in the latter half of the seventeenth century of one more, this time much belated, attempt at reinstating a confessional state model, with all its later consequences to the state and country.
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